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Belly Up To The Bar: Your Bar Tab is
Compelled Membership and Mandatory
Fees
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, members of the California state integrated bar received a
bill from the bar for $417, along with a bill for various section
memberships.' All practicing attorneys in California are required to
be members of the California state integrated bar2 under penalty of
law.3 Practicing attorneys are also required to pay a bar fee.4 This
comment will discuss the constitutional issues involved in both com-
pulsory bar membership and compulsory bar dues, using the collective
bargaining unit as a paradigm. 5
Compelled membership in the bar raises issues of the first amend-
ment rights of association and speech. 6 The interest of the state in
regulating the profession of law and improving the administration of
1. See State Bar of Cal., Membership Fee Notice (1989) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal,
attorneys in the first three years of bar membership paid less than $417).
2. See Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1159-61, 767 P.2d 1020, 1023-24, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 542, 545-46 (1989). An integrated state bar is an organization of lawyers within a state
that is given a large measure of self-government. Id. An integrated bar performs such functions
as regulating the profession of law and improving the administration of justice. Id.
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125-26 (West 1974).
4. Id. § 6140 (West Supp. 1989).
5. See infra notes 128-251 and accompanying text.
6. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1176-79, 767 P.2d at 1036-37, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting) (1989). See also Aood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233-35 (1977) (the
freedom of an individual to associate in order to advance his beliefs is protected by the first and
fourteenth amendment). See generally Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)
(the right to associate includes the right not to associate, or in other words the right of
nonassociation).
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justice may warrant the abridgement;7 however, the interest of the
state may not be sufficient when dues paid by objecting bar members8
are put to uses not germane to furthering the state's interest in
compelling membership in the bar.9 The integrated state bar is com-
parable to a collective bargaining unit. 0
As in the integrated bar arena, first amendment issues of association
and speech are raised when an employee is forced to join and to
support a collective bargaining unit as a condition of continued
employment." The interest of a state in smooth labor-management
negotiations as well as the desire to prevent the free rider 2 problem
justifies some limited abridgement of the first amendment right of
association and speech in the form of an agency fee.' 3 The abridgement
may not be justified, however, when the agency fees of nonunion
dissenters 4 are used for purposes not sufficiently germane to the
compelling state interest in the collective bargaining process.'"
This comment first discusses United States Supreme Court's treat-
ment of mandatory membership and the permissible uses of agency
fees of dissenting nonmembers.' 6 Next, this comment will apply the
principles established in part one to similar problems found in the
7. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961). See Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1161-62, 767
P.2d at 1025, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 547 (1989).
8. Objecting bar members are those who object to expenditures made by the state bar,
claiming a violation of interests protected by the first amendment. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1175-
76, 767 P.2d at 1035, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 557 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1186-88, 767 P.2d at 1043, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 565 (Kaufman J., dissenting). See
Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (lth Cir. 1986). See infra notes 174-218 and
accompanying text (discussion of expenditures that are chargeable against dissenting bar members).
10. Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1566-67 (the court defined a collective bargaining unit as representing
the interest of a class of employees to an employer and then outlined the similarities of a
collective bargaining unit and an integrated bar). See Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (the Court used the bar as a fortiori example of the effect of compelled
membership in a collective bargaining unit).
11. U.S. CoNST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech
... or the right of people to peaceably assemble ... ). See Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1566 (the state
bar is closely analogous to a union because members are forced to support the association's
positions).
12. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761 (1961) (the free rider
problem exists when employees enjoy the benefits of collective bargaining unit without sharing
in the cost).
13. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742-44 (1963) (the agency shop is
designed to charge non union employees represented by the collective bargaining unit for the
benefit provided by the unit). See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224-26 (1977).
14. Non-union employee dissenters are employees that desire to disassociate themselves from
the union and retain their jobs. Street, 367 U.S. at 765-70.
15. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 (the state's interest is in smooth labor negotiations and the
elimination of the free rider).
16. See infra notes 32-128 and accompanying text.
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arena of the integrated bar. 17 Finally, this comment will propose that
the bar adopt expedient, fair, and objective avenues of objection for
those attorneys wishing to assert the protection of the first amend-
ment.1 8
II. COLLECTI-V BARGAInING UNiTS
Compelled membership in a state integrated bar is analogous to a
collective bargaining unit agency shop. 19 An agency shop O is a work
place in which a union has been designated, usually by the vote of
the employees, as the exclusive collective bargaining agent of all the
employees.2' While union members are required to pay full dues,
nonunion dissenters are required to pay a fee not to exceed membership
dues. This fee is known as an agency fee. An agency fee is designed
to eliminate the free rider problem that exists when an employee is
allowed to enjoy the benefit of collective bargaining without sharing
in the cost. 24
This section will discuss four issues regarding mandatory membership
and the permissible uses of dissenting nonmember's agency fees. 2 The
first issue to be addressed is compelled membership as a condition of
continued employment. 6 Second, this section will discuss the expenses
that unions can charge to nonunion dissenters without unconstitution-
17. See infra notes 130-253 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text.
19. Gibson v. Florida Bar 798 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1986). Cf., Railway Employees'
Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (compelled membership in a union is compared with
compelled membership in an integrated bar).
20. See generally R. GoRmAe, BAsic TExT ON LABOR LAW 639, 642-46 (1976) (under an
agency shop agreement a union that acts as an exclusive bargaining agent may charge non-union
members a fee for acting as their bargaining representative).
21. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 762 (1961) (an agency
shop consists of a class of employees whose interests are represented by a collective bargaining
unit). See also Note, Agency Shops and the First Amendment: A Balancing Test In Need of
Unweighted Scales, 18 RuTERs L.J. 833 (1987) (general discussion of agency shops) See generally
R. GoRAN, BA sc TEXT ON LABOR LAw, 639, 642-46 (1976) (for a discussion of unions and
agency shops).
22. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 737 U.S. 734, 742 n.8 (1963).
23. Id. at 742-43 (the agency fee is designed to charge the dissenter for the benefit provided
to him by the collective bargaining unit).
24. Street, 367 U.S. at 765-70 (the free rider problem led Congress to empower the collective
bargaining unit to charge members of the represented class that were not members of the unit a
fee to cover the cost of the benefits that accrued to the nonmember as a result of the effort by
the unit on behalf of the class, the Court referred to H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
4).
25. See infra notes 32-128 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
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ally infringing on the right of free speech.27 Third, the procedures
designed to protect the rights of dissenting nonmembers to object to
the use of agency fees will be explored.28 Finally, once the dissenting
nonmember has objected to the use of the fees, this section will suggest
possible remedies that will prevent even temporary infringement of
first amendment rights.29
A. Compelled Membership
1. The Free Rider Problem
Complete freedom of association leads to the free rider problem,
which arises when employees share in the benefits of collective bar-
gaining without sharing in the cost. 0 The converse of the free rider is
mandatory membership and payment of dues as a condition of con-
tinued employment, however, this infringes on first amendment rights
by forcing association.3 ' The United States Supreme Court first en-
countered the issue of compelled membership in the collective bar-
gaining arena in RELA v. Hanson.32 The Court in Hanson upheld the
Railway Labor Act (RLA), which authorizes collective bargaining
units. 33 The Hanson Court held that the RLA, which required the
recipient of the benefits of union representation to provide financial
support to the union,M was a valid exercise of power under the
commerce clause, 35 therefore the first amendment right of association
was not violated. 36
The collective bargaining units must have access to considerable
funds to perform their functions of procuring employee benefits and
27. See infra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 90-123 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
30. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 761, 765-66 (1961) (the concern
over the free rider problem overbore the arguments in favor of complete freedom of choice).
31. Pattern Maker's League v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 95, 106 (1985).
32. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
33. 45 U.S.C.A § 152 Eleventh (vest 1986). The Railway Labor Act authorized the unions
and the railroad industry to enter into agreements affecting the rights of railroad employees. Id.
34. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (the Court expressed no opinion on the closed shop arrangement
authorized by the RLA because the issue was not properly before them).
35. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cI. 1, 3. "The Congress shall have power to... regulate
Commerce... among the several states.... ." Id.
36. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (the Court interpreted the RLA to authorize union shop
agreements between interstate railroads and unions).
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settling labor-management disputes.3 7 The United States Supreme Court
in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street 8 stated that the money
needed to perform union functions must come from dues paid by the
represented class. 39 The Court further held that to allow nonmembers
to participate in the benefits while sharing none of the cost was
unfair40 In addition, the Court in Street found that in prescribing
collective bargaining units as the means of settling labor disputes,
Congress has given the unions a clearly defined and delineated role to
play in effectuating the congressional policy of stabilizing labor rela-
tions. 4' Furthermore, the Court held in Steel v. Louisville N.R. Co.
42
that Congress had clothed collective bargaining unit representatives
with powers comparable to legislative bodies, thus allowing the unions
to create and restrict the rights of the employees they represent.
43
There are, however, limits on the extent to which membership in the
union can be compelled as well as uses to which the union can put
collected fees."
2. The Choice Not to Join a Union
Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 45 the Wagner
Act of 19354 allowed unions to negotiate closed shop agreements. 47
The Taft-Hartley Act effectively eliminated compulsory union mem-
bership by outlawing closed shop agreements. 48 The Taft-Hartley Act
37. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961).
38. 367 U.S. 740 (1960).
39. Id. at 761.
40. Id. The Court refers to H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.4: "[U]nder the RLA,
the collective bargaining unit representative is required to represent fairly, equitably, and in good
faith the entire membership of the craft or class, including nonunion members. Benefits resulting
from collective bargaining may not be withheld from employees because they are not members
of the union." Id. at 761-62.
41. Id. at 760 (the clearly defined role of collective bargaining units, as delineated by
Congress, is to procure employee benefits and settle labor management disputes).
42. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
43. Id. at 202.
44. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448-55 (1984).
45. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et. seq. (West 1973).
46. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et. seq. (vest 1973) (the Wagner Act, generally barred employer
discrimination on the basis of union membership; however, the Act did not forbid the employer
from making an agreement with a collective bargaining unit that required as a condition of
employment membership in the unit).
47. 29 U.S.C.A. §158(a)(3) (West 1973). See Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108
S.Ct. 2641, 2649-50 (1988).
48. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(2) (West 1973) (an employer may not terminate an employee on
the grounds that the employee was denied membership in the union, or was expelled from the
union for any reason other than failure to pay dues).
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opened an avenue for union dissenters to opt out of union member-
ship .49
The Court, in Pattern Maker's League v. NLRB,5 0 protected the
right of employees to opt out of union membership and become
dissenting nonmembers. 5 1 The Court held that the Taft-Hartley Act52
protected the first amendment right of employees who chose not to
associate within the collective bargaining arena.5 3 The Court interpreted
the Taft-Hartley Act to say that union membership could no longer
be a requirement of employment, nor could a union member who
later became dissatisfied with the union and resigned from its mem-
bership be fired.54 The Court held that although an employer and a
union may enter into an agreement that all employees must be "mem-
bers" of the collective bargaining unit as a condition of continued
employment, the membership requirement has been reduced to "its
financial core." '55
After determining that actual membership in a collective bargaining
unit cannot be required because the state's interest is neither sufficiently
compelling nor accomplished in the least restrictive manner, 56 the Court
then addressed whether nonmember dissenters are obligated to support
union activities not germane to the compelling government interest in
collective bargaining. 57 In Street, the Court recognized the need to
require employees to share the cost of negotiating and administering
collective bargaining contracts. 58 One looks in vain, however, for any
suggestion that Congress also meant to provide the union with the
means to force employees to support political causes which they
49. Pattern Maker's League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106 (1985).
50. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
51. Id. at 106.
52. Id. (the Taft-Hartley act protects those employees who wanted to resign from a union,
or not to join the union).
53. Id.
54. Id. (the Act allows employees to resign at any time and protects the employee who does
not wish to associate with the union, or whose views are divergent from the views of the union
and therefore no longer wants to financially support union positions).
55. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (the "financial core" is
represented by the fee the dissenting nonunion employee is required to pay to avoid the free
rider problem discussed supra).
56. See Gibson v. Florida Bar, 789 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11th Cir. 1986) (first amendment
challenges were analyzed under a two part test requiring the state action be justified by a
compelling state interest and the means chosen to accomplish that interest be the least restrictive
means of accomplishing that interest).
57. See infra notes 61-90 and accompanying text.
58. International Ass'n of Machinist v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 766 (1961). Fees paid are
assessments and are used to finance the activities of the general negotiating committee. Fees are
based on the expenses and the work of that committee. Id.
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oppose 9 or activities which are not germane to the interest of the
government in the process of collective bargaining. 6°
B. Collective Bargaining Unit Representatives and Expenses That
are Chargeable to the Dissenters
An employee who has chosen to become a union member cannot
complain of an unconstitutional first amendment infringement regard-
ing the use of union dues because the member has chosen to associate
with the union.6 I The employee who exercises the first amendment
right not to be a member of the union, but is represented by the
collective bargaining unit, presents a different situation because only
expenditures germane to the collective bargaining process are charge-
able against dissenters.6 2 This gives rise to a threshold question of
what constitutes expenditures germane to the collective bargaining
process.6 3
The Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education64 recognized
the difficulties in determining which expenses are germane to the
compelling government interest in the collective bargaining process.
6 5
59. Id. at 764 (the Court found that Congress had incorporated safeguards in the statute to
protect dissenters' interest). See H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 68 (the primary purpose
of the Railway Labor Act is to prevent discharge of employees not admitted to the union);
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 Eleventh (West 1986) (the relevant part of the act
discussed by the Court in Street). Cf. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 466
(1984) (the Court quite candidly admitted there was little legislative history to support this
conclusion, and plenty to support the opposite view; nevertheless, the Court interpreted the Act
to not allow collective bargaining units the power to force dissenters to financially support all
union activities).
60. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447. See infra notes 64-89 and accompanying text (discussion of what
expenses are chargeable against dissenters).
61. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977). See generally Pattern Maker's
League v. NLRB 473 U.S. 95, 104 (1985) (union members who choose to remain members can
not complain of the union use of fees).
62. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36; Brotherhood of Railway & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 737 U.S.
113, 119 (1962).
63. See infra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
64. 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977).
65. Id. at 236. In dicta the Abood Court discussed that there might be distinctions between
the private sector and the public sector in regard to chargeable expenses. Id. The Abood court
said that there may be difficult problems in drawing lines between collective bargaining activities
for which contributions may be compelled and ideological activities unrelated to collective
bargaining for which contributions may not be compelled. Id. In Abood, the Court predicted
that the line between acceptable uses of agency fees in the public sector may be somewhat hazier
than the lines in the private sector. Id. The Abood court found that the differences between the
public and private sector are not in the nature of the employee but rather in the nature of the
employer. Id. at 230. Yet the Court reiterated that the ights of the public sector employees were
not diminished by the nature of the employer and are the same as the rights of private sector
1287
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The Court in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,66 however, stated
that it is tyrannical to force an individual to contribute even "three
pence" for the "propagation of opinions which he disbelieves". 67 The
Court in Hudson held that regardless of the amount of money at
stake, the dissenters have a clear interest in not being compelled to
subsidize the propagation of political or ideological views that they
oppose.6s
In Street, the Court established a test when state action has triggered
first amendment protection using an overtly political standard in order
to determine when the proposed expenditure is not properly chargeable
against dissenters.69 The Street standard was reiterated by the Court
in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks7O holding that the RLA did
not authorize a union to spend money collected from a dissenting
employee to support political causes opposed by the dissenter.71 The
Court stated that using fees paid by nonunion dissenters for political
ends is unrelated to the congressional policy of eliminating the free
rider 2
The Ellis Court further refined the Street overtly political standard
by holding that unions could not charge dissenting employees for
activities and causes not germane to the governmental interest in
collective bargaining units. 73 The Ellis Court applied a two step process
in determining what expenditures are germane to the state's interest. 74
First, the Court attempted to interpret the statute so that it did not
employees. Id. 229. In Abood, the Court held differences in private and public sector unions
simply do not translate into differences in first amendment rights. Id. at 232. Thus the samefirst amendment rights to freedom of expression that the private sector dissenter enjoys, thepublic sector dissenter will enjoy. Id. E.g. Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1984).
Many courts around the country have put a great deal of emphasis on the dicta, and whendealing with public sector unions have allowed certain expenditures by unions for overtly political
causes to be charged against the dissenting nonmembers' fees because of the assumption that theprocess of negotiating with the employer in the public sector is inherently political. Id. The New
Jersey Supreme Court allowed the use of agency fees, over the objecting of dissenting nonmem-bers, to support certain lobbying activities pertinent to collective bargaining and contract admin-
istration, but not for partisan political activities or ideological causes related only incidentally to
collective bargaining functions. Id.
66. 106 S.Ct. 1066 (1986).
67. Id. at 1075 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
68. Id.
69. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-70 (1961).
70. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
71. Id. at 451-53 (such as supporting a political candidate).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 448.
74. Id. at 447, 456. See Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1186-89, 767 P.2d 1020, 1043-
44, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 565-66 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
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infringe on constitutionally protected rights. 75 Second, when the pro-
posed expenditure did infringe on a constitutional right, the Court
conducted a three part first amendment analysis of the expense being
charged to the dissenter.7 6 First, the judicial body must determine
whether the challenged activity is germane to the compelling govern-
mental interest justifying the collection of compelled dues.7 7 Second,
the judicial body must determine whether the challenged expenditure
involves additional first amendment infringements on the dissenters.7 8
Third, the additional infringement must be justified by an identifiable
government interest.7 9
In Ellis the Court ruled on five specific expenditures objected to by
nonmember dissenters. 80 First, the Court held that the use of agency
fees to finance conventions were properly chargeable to dissenters
because the Court found that the unions were required by statute to
hold a referendum or convention every five years in order to elect
officers. 81 Second, the Court held that the cost of social activities were
properly chargeable against dissenters because these de minimis expen-
ditures were for activities similar to the convention and necessary to
effect more harmonious working relationships and therefore suffi-
ciently related to the compelling government interest in collective
bargaining. 82 Third, certain information printed in union publications
are not chargeable against the dissenters.8 3 The Court adopted a line
by line approach in analyzing published material and held that if a
union could not charge a dissenter for a certain activity it certainly
could not charge that dissenter for writing about that activity.8 Fourth,
the Ellis Court, in ruling on the use of a dissenter's agency fee for
union organizing efforts, disallowed the union to charge dissenters for
75. Ellis, 466 at 445-48.
76. Id. at 447-56. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 776 (1961);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977); Keller 47 Cal. 3d at 1186-89, 767
P.2d at 1043-44, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (recognizing the state's
interests do not justify compulsory financial support by dissenting members).
77. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447.
78. Id. at 456.
79. Id. See Keller at 47 Cal. 3d 1188-89, 767 P.2d at 1044, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566 (1989)
(Kaufman, J., dissenting) (the infringement must be justified by the governmental purposes
underlying the requirement of compulsory membership).
80. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448-55.
81. Id. at 448-49 (the Court refused to fault the union for opting to hold conventions rather
than using the referendum method).
82. Id. at 449-50.
83. Id. at 451.
84. Id.
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efforts aimed at recruiting the dissenter."5 Fifth, the Court held that
only judicial proceedings directly connected with the bargaining process
could be charged to dissenters.16 The Court in Ellis established a
minimum standard for determining what expenditures are chargeable
against dissenters by holding that the union may expend collected fees
under the union shop agreement only in support of activities germane
to the compelling interest of the government in collective bargaining. 7
C. The Constitutionally Acceptable Process
First amendment rights are fragile and demand sensitive procedure.8
In Hudson the Court outlined the necessary constitutionally adequate
procedure that unions must make available to nonmember dissenters. 9




A nonmember dissenter must have adequate information in order
to make a meaningful objection to the use of compelled dues. 9' Because
85. Id. at 451-53 (the Court further concluded that Congress did not have this in mind
when they were considering the free rider problem).
86. Id. at 453.
87. Id. at 456. It is important to note that the Ellis Court did both a statutory analysis and
a constitutional analysis under the RLA. Id. The Court found that when there is government
action, like that by Congress in the RLA compelling a private person to act, the statute must
be interpreted narrowly. Id. When, however, the government action infringes on constitutional
rights, a constitutional analysis must be done in order to determine: (1) if the government's
interest is compelling; and (2) if the means chosen to bring about that government interest is
necessary. Id. See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1983) (applying this
analysis). See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text (for a complete discussion of the Ellis
constitutional analysis).
88. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. Rv. 518, 551 (1969). See
infra notes 92-128 and accompanying text.
89. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1075-78 (1985) (although Hudson
is based entirely on a public sector constitutional question, there is no reason why the procedures
outlined therein could not to be applied to the private sector). See also Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (rights of the public sector employee are the same as the
rights of the private sector employees for first amendment purposes). See generally Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 551 (first amendment rights are fragile
and need sensitive due process to safeguard them).
90. See infra notes 96-123 and accompanying text (discussion of Hudson).
91. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1076.
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the union is in control of the information that the dissenter requires
to make a meaningful objection, the union must make the information
available to the dissenter.Y The Court in The Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks v. Allen93 stated that dissenters must affirmatively indicate any
objections to union expenditures of agency fees. 94 Under an agency
shop agreement, procedural safeguards are necessary to prevent com-
pulsory subsidization of ideological activity by objecting nonmember
employees, while enabling the union to require all employees to
contribute to the cost of the collective bargaining process. 95 The first
amendment protects the right of nonunion employees when the gov-
ernment authorizes collective bargaining units.9 The first amendment
requires that the objection procedure be carefully tailored to minimize
union infringement on those rights 7 The nonunion employee must
have a fair opportunity to identify the impact on first amendment
rights and be able to assert a meritorious claim.9
A meaningful objection to the use of agency fees requires that the
dissenter must be informed of the proposed uses of those fees.9
Hudson emphasizes that adequate disclosure requires the collective
bargaining unit to identify the chargeable expenditures, rather than
merely acknowledge nonchargeable expenditures and thereby treat the
balance as chargeable by implication.1°° Adequate disclosure can be
accomplished in a number of ways without unduly restricting the
ability of the union to collect fees necessary to fulfilling its statutory
functions. 01
First, voluntary contributions could be required to fund expenditures
unrelated to the collective bargaining process, thus entirely eliminating
the need for dissenters to raise objections.1°2 Second, bills that the
union sends out to collect dues could itemize expenditures for the past
and current fiscal year.103 These bills could include a statement of
proposed future expenditures as weU.'0 For those dissenters who do
92. Id.
93. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1073-75.
96. Id. at 1074.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1076.
100. Id.
101. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (for discussion of ways disclosure could
be accomplished).
102. L. TRIE, AMmuc 4 -i CONsTrrUTIo NAL LAW 589 n.5 (1978).
103. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1074, 1077-78.
104. Id.
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not agree with the political or ideological uses for which funds are
earmarked, the union could offer objecting dissenters an advance
reduction in dues covering the proportionate cost of questionable
activities. 105 Occasions may arise when the union believes that uses of
fees to which the dissenter objects are germane to the compelling
government interest in the collective bargaining process, and therefore,
are properly chargeable against the dissenter. 10e Consequently, an av-
enue of objection and appeal must be made available to the dissenter. 107
b. Objection and Appeal
The Court in Hudson found two reasons why procedural safeguards
are necessary to prevent the compulsory subsidization of ideological
activities by the unions. 0 First, although the governmental interest in
smooth labor negotiations is strong enough to support an agency shop,
those rights protected by the first amendment require safeguards that
will minimize the constitutional infringement.' °9 Second, because the
first amendment rights of a nonmember dissenter are being affected,
the Constitution requires that the dissenter be able to assert an
informed and meritorious claim for relief." 0
The Hudson Court held that the objection procedure must minimize
the risk that an agency fee will be used for impermissible purposes."'
Hudson establishes three criteria that must be part of any procedural
process."2 First, the dissenter must have adequate information con-
cerning the use of fees to assert a meritorious claim."' Second, once
the dissenter has made an objection, the proportionate funds" 4 must
105. Id. at 1074, 1077-78.
106. See generally Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448-53 (1984) (the
court analyzed five specific expenditures when the union and the dissenter disagreed as to what
was properly chargeable against the dissenter). See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the five specific areas).
107. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1074.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1074. See Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11th Cir. 1986) (the union
must adopt the least restrictive means in achieving the government's goal).
110. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1074. An employee must be able to identify infringements on
first amendment rights in order to object. Id. The information regarding what the fees were
spent on are under the control of the bargaining unit. Id. at 1076.
111. Id. at 1075 (temporary improper use of fees violates the dissenter's first amendment
rights during the time the fees are withheld from the dissenter and used improperly).
112. Id. at 1078.
113. Id. See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text (for a discussion of what constitutes
adequate disclosure).
114. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1078 (proportionate funds are the proportionate amount of fees
that the dissenter has reasonably challenged).
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be protected so that they will not be used even temporarily for a
challenged purpose." 5 Third, the dissenter is entitled to an impartial
hearing that is reasonably prompt and in a fair and objective forum
before an impartial decision maker.16 The Hudson Court held that
one possible solution might be expeditious arbitration as long as the
selection of the arbitrators did not represent an unrestricted choice by
the union. 117
D. The Constitutionally Acceptable Remedy
Once an unconstitutional infringement on first amendment rights
has been found, the dissenter is entitled to a constitutionally accept-
able remedy.18 If an impartial decision maker determines that the
challenged use of the agency fee is impermissible, that expenditure
cannot be charged against the dissenter." 9 The union must make full
restitution for the amount of the agency fee earmarked for imper-
missible activities plus any interest earned on the money. 20 The Court
in Hudson requires that the amount reasonably in dispute be kept
in an interest bearing escrow account while the result is pending.1
2 1
The Court further held that rebate programs are constitutionally
inadequate because a rebate program allows the union temporary use
of the agency fee. '
III. THE CAUFoRN A STATE BAR
Compelled membership in the bar raises issues of first amendment
rights of association and speech.2 3 The Court has held that the
115. Id. at 1078. The court held that the amounts reasonably in dispute must be placed in
escrow while the dispute is pending. Id. The Court stated that if the union chooses to use an
interest bearing escrow account to protect an amount less than the entire amount of the dissenter's
fees, the union must carefully justify the limited escrow on the basis of an independent audit
and independently verify the escrow figures. Id. at 1078 n.23. See also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Assoc., 643 F.Supp. 1306, 1332-34 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (example of an application of Hudson).
116. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1077 (the court found that the procedure in question was
inadequate because the entire process was controlled by the union: the first two steps of the
review process were heard by union officials, and the third by an arbitrator chosen by union
officials).
117. Id. at 1077 n.20 & n.21.
118. Id. at 1074.
119. Lehmert v. Ferris Faculty Assoc., 643 F.Supp. 1306, 1334 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
120. Id. See also Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1074 (1986) (holding that interest must be paid on
fees impermissibly used and properly objected to).
121. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. at 1078.
122. Id. at 1074 (pure rebate programs are an infringement on the first amendment rights of
objecting nonmember dissenters).
123. Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1176-79, 767 P.2d 1020, 1036-37, 255 Cal. Rptr.
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interest of the state in regulating the profession of law and improving
the administration of justice is sufficient to abridge first amendment
rights.'2 The interest of the state may not be sufficient, however,
when dues paid by objecting bar members are put to uses not germane
to furthering the state interest in compelling membership in the bar.'12
The first amendment analysis employed by the Court in the col-
lective bargaining arena should apply in the integrated bar arena.126
The integrated state bar is comparable to the collective bargaining
unit in six ways. 2 7 First, both require the represented class to pay
fees.'12 Second, both spend funds to influence the political process. 2 9
Third, both represent occupationally homogeneous groups. 3 0 Fourth,
both elect association representatives.' 3' Fifth, both are comprised of
individuals who often disagree on matters of private interest. 32 Sixth,
both are associations sanctioned by government action having the
capacity to infringe first amendment rights.' Therefore, the four
main issues discussed supra; namely, compelled membership, charge-
able expenses, meaningful process, and remedy, are applicable in the
integrated bar arena. 34 The Court has consistently held that when a
state compels financial membership in an association as a condition
precedent to earning a livelihood, the first amendment rights of
objectors are violated.135 Furthermore, when mandatory dues are
expended upon philosophical and ideological causes not germane to
a compelling state interest, first amendment rights are also violated.136
542, 558-59 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 233-35 (1977).
124. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961).
125. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1176-79, 767 P.2d at 1036-37, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59 (1989)(Kaufman, J., dissenting). See infra notes 175-218 and accompanying text (discussion of expen-
ditures that are chargeable against dissenting bar members).
126. Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1566-78 (l1th Cir. 1986). See infra note 64-90
and accompanying text.






133. Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956). See Keller v. State
Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1174-75, 767 P.2d 1020, 1034, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 556 (1989) (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
134. See infra notes 141-226 and accompanying text. See generally Gibson v. Florida Bar,
798 F.2d 1564 (lth Cir. 1986); Keller, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542(1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (application of the union paradigm to an integrated bar).
135. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35 (1977). See Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1567; Keller 47 Cal. 3d at
1174-75, 767 P.2d at 1034, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
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A. Compelled Membership in the Bar
The California Legislature has empowered the California integrated
bar3 7 to aid in all matters pertaining to the regulation of the practice
of law, the advancement of the science of jurisprudence, and the
improvement of the administration of justice.138 The California Leg-
islature has mandated membership in the state bar as a condition
precedent to practicing law in California. 39 In Keller, the California
Supreme Court held that the state bar is a public entity'40 and that
compelled membership in the bar was constitutional.' 4'
To conduct a first amendment analysis on the mandatory bar
membership requirement, a court must first establish that there exists
state action. 42 The Court in RELA v. Hanson43 stated that compelled
membership in a union is comparable to compelled membership in
a state bar. 4 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,45 the Court stated
that freedom of association presupposes a freedom not to associate
and that infringements on freedom of association could only be
justified by a compelling state interest. 146 Even so, once the state
137. The California State Bar is an integrated bar, and as such is an organization of members
of the legal profession of the state with a large measure of self government, performing such
functions as examining applicants for admission to the state bar, formulating rules of professional
conduct, disciplining members for misconduct, preventing unlawful practice of the law and
improving the administration of justice. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1159-61, 767 P.2d at 1023-24, 255
Cal. Rptr. at 545-46. The California State Bar is also required to: cooperate with and give
assistance to the Commission on Judicial Performance (CAL. Gov'r CODE § 68725 (West 1976));
assist the Law Revision Commission (CAL. GOv'T CODE § 8287 (West Supp. 1989)); and evaluate
the judicial qualifications of gubernatorial nominees for appointment to courts of record (CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12011.5 (West 1980)). The California State Bar is authorized to do all acts
"necessary or expedient for the administration of its affairs and the attainment of its purposes."
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6001(g) (West 1974). See also B. Wrrnw, CALroiFMA PRocEnurE,
Arrommvs § 259 (2nd ed. 1985 Supp. 1988) (for a discussion of the functions of the California
State Bar).
138. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6031 (West 1974)
139. Id. § 6125 (West 1974). "No person shall practice law in [California] unless he is an
active member of the state bar" Id.
140. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1164-65, 767 P.2d at 1027, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 549 (1989) (the
California Supreme Court found that the bar was a public corporation because it is authorized
to perform government functions by the state Constitution, statutes, and California state court
decisions).
141. Id. at 1161-62, 767 P.2d at 1025, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 547 (1989).
142. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 164-65 (1978).
143. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
144. Id. at 238.
145. 468 U.S. 609 (1983).
146. Id. at 623. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp. 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (the Court
held that the free rider problem could be solved without compelling membership in the union).
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interest is identified as compelling, the interest being advanced must
be accomplished by the least restrictive means . 47 The Court in
Roberts established a three part test to resolve first amendment rights
issues. 148 First, the government must establish a compelling interest
in infringing on first amendment rights in the chosen arena. 49 Second,
the government must adopt the least restrictive means to accomplish
the compelling interest.' 5 Third, the means adopted by the State
must be necessary to the accomplishment of the compelling govern-
ment interest.'-'
The United States Supreme Court has never held that the first
amendment right of citizens to associate is strong enough to overcome
the state's interest in maintaining a state bar. 152 To the contrary, the
United States Supreme Court held in Lathrop v. Donohue"3 that the
state could compel a lawyer to belong to an integrated state bar and
pay dues. 5 4 The Court reasoned that the state has a compelling
interest in maintaining an integrated bar justifying mandatory mem-
bership. 5
There are instances where the Court has held that the state interest
did not justify mandatory membership in an association as a con-
dition of continued employment. 5 6 The Court has held in the collec-
tive bargaining arena that the interests of the government in smooth
labor negotiations and the elimination of the free rider could be
accomplished in a less restrictive manner than compelling membership
in the union. 5 7 The Court reduced the membership requirement to
a financial core. 58 The Court interpreted the Taft-Hartley Act to
147. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1983). See also Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1074 n.11 (1986) (least restrictive means must be adopted by
the state).




152. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (the Court held that the order to integrate
the wisconsin state bar did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the first amendment rights,
given the limited scope of the bar in Wisconsin).
153. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
154. Id. at 832-37.
155. Id. at 820 (the Court did not discuss alternatives that would be less restrictive as later
required by Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1983)).
156. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text (discussion of the Court's rejection of
closed shop agreements in that collective bargaining arena).
157. Pattern Maker's League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106 (1985). See supra note 54-59 and
accompanying text.
158. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (the payment of agency fees
represent the financial core required to eliminate the free rider problem and achieve the
government's goal of smooth labor relations). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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allow only open shop agreements, allowing dissenters to opt out of
the union.
159
The least restrictive means test in a first amendment analysis should
address the issue of whether allowing members to exercise the option
to opt out will undermine the state bar's ability to perform its
statutory functions. 160 The Court in Lathrop held that the state has
a compelling interest in the regulation of the practice of law and the
improvement of the administration of justice justifying mandatory
bar membership. 161 The Court's rationale in Roberts holds that
compelling government interests must be accomplished by the least
restrictive means. 162 Eighteen states now have achieved this interest
without integrated bars. 16 However, Lathrop did not address whether
the expenditure of mandatory bar fees must be limited to matters
germane to achieving the state interest.?64 The bar should not be
permitted to expend the collected mandatory fees for purposes not
germane to the government's compelling interest in maintaining the
association.165
B. Chargeable Expenditures
1. The Majority in Keller
The recent California Supreme Court decision of Keller v. The
State Bar66 explicitly rejected the union paradigm as well as the need
for a constitutional analysis of bar expenditures when interpreting
the nature of the California state bar. 67 The Keller court did not
employ a constitutional analysis, but rather summarily concluded
159. Pattern Maker's League, 437 U.S. at 106. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
160. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1074 (1985); Gibson v. Florida
Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text
(discussion of the possibility of accomplishing the state objective without compelling membership
in the state bar).
161. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 832-37 (1961).
162. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (1985). See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text (for
proposals on how the bar could accomplish its mission without mandatory membership).
163. Telephone conversation with the American Bar Association (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
164. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 847-48 (1961) (there was not a majority opinion on the expenditure
issue, four members of the plurality found that the issue was not properly presented).
165. Id. (compulsory fees may not be spent on lobbying or ideological activities that are not
related to the purpose that brought the bar together in the first place).
166. 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1989).
167. Id. at 1157, 1164-65, 767 P.2d at 1022, 1027, 255 Cal. Rptr. 544, 549.
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that the state bar may expend compelled dues to finance disciplining
members, filing amicus curiae briefs, lobbying the legislature, advising
the legislature, delegate conferences, disseminating information and
anything else the legislature does not explicitly forbid the bar to
do. 163 The only expenditure the California Supreme Court forbade
the bar from engaging in was partisan electioneering. 169 By a four to
three vote, the Keller court held that the integrated bar was a public
agency because the bar performs governmental functions, and is
treated like a governmental agency by the state Constitution, statutes,
and court decisions. 170 Once the Keller court characterized the bar as
a governmental agency, the court held that the bar may use revenue
from whatever source derived for any purpose within statutory au-
thority.'7' The California Supreme Court held that absent explicit
legislative prohibition, the state bar could expend funds on ideological
and political matters so long as the matter did not promote a partisan
position in an election campaign. 72
2. A Critique of the Keller Majority
a. The Dissent
Three members of the court dissenting in Keller accused the ma-
jority of engaging in pure sophistry when the court refused to impose
first amendment restrictions on the state bar. 73 The Keller dissent
insisted that the first amendment prohibits the state bar from ex-
pending the fees of objecting members on matters not sufficiently
related to the governmental interest justifying mandatory bar mem-
168. Id. at 1156-57, 1164-65, 1168-71, 1172-73, 767 P.2d at 1021-22, 1027, 1030-31, 1033,
255 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44, 549, 552-53, 555.
169. Id. at 1169-71, 767 P.2d at 1031, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (absent "clear and explicit
legislation, [the bar] may not expend funds to promote a partisan position in an election
campaign).
170. Id. at 1164-65, 767 P.2d at 1027, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
171. Id. at 1167-68, 767 P.2d at 1029, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 551. But see Gibson v. Florida Bar,
798 F.2d 1564, 1568 (lth Cir. 1986) (because the bar represents only one segment of the
population its lobbying activities are viewed more accurately as partisan politics than the
supposedly impartial recommendations of a governmental entity).
172. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1169-71, 767 P.2d at 1031, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 553. See San Francisco
Daily Journal, Feb. 24, 1989, at 7, col. 1 (rhe Keller decision is currently on petition to the
United States Supreme Court, which has not yet granted certiorari).
173. Keller, at 1184-85, 767 P.2d at 1041, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 563 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
1298
1989 / Mandatory Bar Membership
bership. 74 In Lathrop, a case holding that membership in the bar
can be compelled, there was no majority view on the political
expenditure question; 175 however, the Court in Abood subsequently
characterized Lathrop by saying that "the only proposition about
which a majority of the Court in Lathrop agreed was that the
constitutional issues should be reached.' 1 76 At the very least, Lathrop
stands for the proposition that the use of mandatory dues in the
integrated bar arena for political or ideological purposes warrants
further constitutional analysis. 177 Therefore when bar expenditures
are assessed to objecting bar members for purposes not germane to
the compelling government interest in the integrated bar first amend-
ment issues arise.178
The Keller court did not adhere to the philosophy of the United
States Supreme Court, reiterated in Hudson, when determining what
expenses are chargeable against dissenters. 179 The California State Bar
is a public corporation,18 0 formed or organized for political or gov-
ernmental purposes; however, according to the Keller dissent, this
alone does not empower the bar to extract funds for the purpose of
supporting political or ideological activities not directly related to the
purpose for which the entity is empowered to levy fees.' 8' The dissent
asserted that the majority should have applied the Court's analysis
in Ellis v. Railway Clerks when determining what fees are properly
174. Id. at 1175-76, 767 P.2d at 1035, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 557 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). See
Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1569 (the Florida state bar's expenditures were subject to constitutional
scrutiny).
175. Lathrop v. Donohue 367 U.S. 820, 847-48 (1961) (four members of the plurality found
that the issue of political expenditures was not properly raised in the court below, and therefore
was not properly before the United States Supreme Court).
176. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 n.29 (1977).
177. Abood 431 U.S. at 233 n.29, 241. See Keller 47 Cal. 3d at 1178-80, 767 P.2d at 1037,
255 Cal. Rptr. at 559 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting); Arrow v. Dow, 636 F.2d 287, 289 (10th
Cir. 1981) (these cases found that generalized allegations are sufficient to raise first amendment
issues).
178. Gibson v. Florida Bar 798 F.2d 1564 (the l1th Cir. adopted the union paradigm first
amendment analysis to the Florida state bar in evaluating the bar expenditures assessed against
objectors).
179. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1174-76, 767 P.2d at 1034-1035, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting). See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1075 (1986) (the
language in Hudson reiterates the holdings in Street, Ellis and Abood, by saying that it is
tyrannical to force an individual to contribute even three cents in order to propagate an opinion
which he does not believe). See International Ass'n. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 776
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234, n.34 (1977);
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984) (the state can not compel a
person to support causes to which the person is opposed as a condition to earning a livelihood).
180. CAL. CONsr. art. VI. §IX (the state bar is a public corporation).
181. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1186-87, 767 P.2d at 1042-43, 255 Cal. Rptr at 564-65 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
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chargeable against dissenters. 82 The Court in Ellis held that only
those expenditures which are germane to the collective bargaining
process are chargeable against dissenters. 83
In Ellis the Court, outlined a three step analysis of the first
amendment issues of chargeable expenditures.8 4 First, the judicial
body must determine whether the challenged activity is germane to
the compelling governmental interest justifying the collection of com-
pelled dues. 18 5 Second, the judicial body must determine whether the
challenged expenditure involves additional first amendment infringe-
ments on the dissenters. 8 6 Third, the judicial body must determine
that the additional infringement is justified by an identifiable com-
pelling governmental interest. 8 7
The dissent in Keller applied the Ellis analysis to the contested
expenditures in three specific areas.' First, the dissent recognized
the need to consider each lobbying activity and proposed amicus
curiae brief in light of the compelling governmental interest in
compelling bar membership.18 9 If the proposed action is not necessary
to achieve the government interest, its cost is not properly chargeable
against dissenters.' ° Second, in regard to the Conference of Delegates
held by the bar, the bar should be required to identify a governmental
interest justifying the expenditure before these expenditures could be
charged against dissenters.' 9' Third, the dissent agreed with the ma-
jority that dissenters cannot be charged for the publication and
dissemination of partisan campaign literature. 92
Furthermore, the dissent argued that the majority should have
applied the rationale of the Abood concurrence, reasoning that
182. Id. at 1192-93, 767 P.2d at 1043, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 565 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
183. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447.
184. Id. at 447-56.
185. Id. at 447. See Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1186-89, 767 P.2d at 1043-44, 25 Cal. Rptr. at
565-66 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (when the challenged expenditure is necessary to finance the
activities assigned to the association by the government, the expenditure is considered germane).
186. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456.
187. Id. See Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1188-89, 767 P.2d at 1044, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting) (the infringement must be justified by the governmental purposes underlying the
requirement of compulsory membership in the state bar).
188. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1188-91, 767 P.2d at 1044-45, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1188-91, 767 P.2d at 1044-45, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
190. Id. See Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (the court in Gibson
held that political and ideological expenditures were not properly chargeable against dissenters).
191. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1188-90, 767 P.2d at 1044-45, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
192. Id. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 450-51 (if a dissenter could not be charged for a specific
activity, the dissenter could not be charged for publishing information about such activities).
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although the state bar may be a governmental agency, the bar only
represents one segment of the population; therefore, expenditures
made by the bar are subject to first amendment scrutiny. 9 3 The issue
of what expenditures are properly chargeable against dissenters should
be analyzed the same way they are analyzed in the collective bar-
gaining unit. 1'4 According to the Keller dissent, the majority's con-
clusion that the bar is a government agency authorized to make
almost unrestricted expenditures,' 95 does not dispose of the objector's
first amendment complaint. 19 Rather, government action compelling
membership in an association as a condition of earning a livelihood
should trigger a first amendment analysis. 197 In the opinion of the
Keller dissent the majority ignored the first amendment analysis which
Lathrop and Abood mandate. 98 In addition to the Keller dissent,
other jurisdictions have interpreted Abood to mandate first amend-
ment scrutiny of expenditures when membership and dues are com-
pelled as a requirement of continued employment. 199 Furthermore,
when the association expends mandatory fees to further philosophical,
ideological or political causes, first amendment protection is available
to dissenters. 2°°
193. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1182-85, 767 P.2d at 1040-41, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 562-63. See Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
194. Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1567-68.
195. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1172-73, 767 P.2d at 1033, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (the only
restriction the majority placed on the bar was that the bar cannot engage in election campaigning).
196. Id. at 1176-78, 767 P.2d at 1035, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 557 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). See
Gibson, 789 F.2d at 1569 (the Florida state bar's expenditures are subject.to first amendment
restrictions).
197. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1179-80, 767 P.2d at 1038, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 560 (1989) (Kaufman,
J., dissenting) (while recognizing the state's interest in the regulation of the practice of law and
improving the administration of justice, these interests do not justify compulsory financial support
by dissenting members). See Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1570 (the bar may speak on any issue so long
as they do not use the fees of dissenters to finance non germane activities). See generally
International Ass'n. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 767-68, 776 (1961); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,
447 (1984) (compelling membership as a condition of continued employment raises first amendment
concerns).
198. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1184-85, 767 P.2d at 1041, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 563 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting). See generally Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1960) and Abood, 431 U.S. at 209
(for discussion of the need to reach the first amendment issues when non germane expenditures
are charged against dissenters).
199. Keller 47 Cal. 3d at 1185-86, 767 P.2d at 1042, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting). See generally Gibson, 798 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1986); Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp.
458 (D.N.M. 1982) (these courts applied the Abood analysis to the expenditures of the state bar,
recognizing the need for a first amendment analysis when membership and dues are compelled
as a condition of continued employment).
200. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1174-75, 767 P.2d at 1034, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
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C. The Eleventh Circuit's Approach
A recent interpretation of Abood, directly conflicts with the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decision in Keller.20 Although the Keller court
was aware of Gibson v. The Florida State Barm it chose not to
adopt the Gibson analysis and instead relied on the weight of
California state law referring to the bar as a governmental entity.23
The Eleventh Circuit in Gibson relied on the concurring opinion in
Abood2°4 to reach the conclusion that "the bar's interests are closely
aligned with those of a labor union, and its lobbying activities are
more accurately viewed as partisan politics than the supposedly
impartial recommendations of a governmental entity.' '2 5
In Gibson, Florida bar members asserted that certain uses of
compelled integrated bar fees violated the first amendment. 206 As in
California, Florida's Constitution empowers the state to regulate the
practice of law and improve the administration of justice. 207 In sum,
the Eleventh Circuit applied the analysis in Abood to the bar setting
and held that the state bar was subject to first amendment constraints
when expending dues on political or ideological activities opposed by
dissenters. 208 Most important, the court in Gibson held that the bar
could not use the fees of dissenters to support causes not germane
to the statutory purpose of the bar.209
201. Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1567-68.
202. 789 F.2d 1564 (1986).
203. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1179-82, 767 P.2d at 1038-1039, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 560-61 (1989)
(Kaufman, J., dissenting).
204. Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring) ... the reason for permitting
the government to spend the payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is
that government is representative of the people. The same cannot be said of a union, which is
representative only of one segment of the population, with certain common interests. The
withholding of financial support is fully protected as speech in this context." Id. (Powell, J.,
concurring).
205. Gibson, 789 F.2d at 1568. See, e.g., In re Chapman, 509 A.2d 753 (N.H. 1986); Reports
of the Committee to Review the State Bar, 334 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. 1983); On Petition to Amend
Rule 2 of the Rules Governing the Bar, 431 A.2d 521 (D.C. 1981) (these decisions have also
noted applicability of Abood in reviewing state bar activities).
206. Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1566.
207. Id. at 1565 (the state constitution empowers the state supreme court through the bar,
to regulate the practice of law and improve the administration of justice).
208. Id. at 1570.
209. Id. at 1568.
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1. Proposals
The California Supreme Court's ruling in Keller forces attorneys
to forego first amendment rights as a condition of practicing law in
California. The state bar is presently free to expend collected dues
for any purpose it sees fit, except for partisan electioneering. Courts
of other jurisdictions will no doubt consider the conflicting rationales
in Keller and Gibson when determining the disposition of challenges
to compelled bar memberships and use of dues. If the Supreme Court
of the United States grants certiorari they should address the follow-
ing issues: compelled membership; chargeable expenses; adequate
procedure and remedy.
2. Compelled Membership
The Court could follow either the NLRB v. General Motors Corp.
or Lathrop when analyzing the issue of compelled bar membership.
The Court in NLRB v General Motors Corp. reduced the bar
membership requirement to a financial core.210 Under the collective
bargaining unit paradigm, the Court would require bar associations
to allow attorneys to opt out of bar membership while requiring
non-member dissenters to pay an agency fee to defray the cost of
activities germane to achieving the stated governmental interest in
maintaining a bar association.211 There are other important profes-
sional associations in which the state does not require membership,
yet the state interest in regulating the practice and improving the
administration of those professions would seem equally compelling.
A persuasive example is the medical profession in which doctors
must obtain a license from the state, but are not required to be
members of a state medical association. 212 This suggests that the
state's interest in regulating the practice of law and improving the
210. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
211. See generally Pattern Maker's League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106 (1985) (the Court
held that the interests of the state could be accomplished without compelling membership;
therefore the Court protected the right of union members to opt out of the union).
212. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2166 et. seq. (West 1974) (outlining the requirements of
practicing law. Once a certificate to practice is issued, no additional membership in a medical
association is required).
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administration of justice could be accomplished without mandatory
membership. Eighteen states currently achieve this goal without in-
tegrated bars.
Alternatively, Lathrop v. Donohue held that the compelling state
interest justifies mandatory membership in the state bar.213 In Lathrop
the Court held that the compelled membership involved in the Wis-
consin state bar infringed minimally upon the first amendment rights
of objectors because of the limited power of the Wisconsin state
bar.214 The California Supreme Court in Keller stated that the Cali-
fornia state bar has more power than most state bars. 215 Because the
California bar's authority constitutes a greater infringement on first
amendment rights than does the Wisconsin bar, the United States
Supreme Court should not expand the application of Lathrop to the
California bar.216
3. Chargeable Expenditures
The Court should address the issue of what expenditures are
properly chargeable against dissenters. 2 7 As discussed supra, the
213. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 832-43 (1961).
214. Id. at 843.
215. Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1166-68, 767 P.2d 1020, 1028-29, 255 Cal. Rptr.
542, 550-51 (1989).
216. The Wisconsin state integrated bar was established by statute and under the direction
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 825. The bar is empowered to define
the rights, obligations, and conditions of membership in the bar, promote the public interest by
maintaining high standards of conduct in the legal profession and aiding in the efficient
administration of justice. Id. The Court held that because of the limitation of the membership
requirement to the compulsory payment of reasonable annual dues, there was no impingement
upon the right of association. Id. at 843. On the other hand, the California Supreme Court in
Keller held that the California State Bar is empowered by the state constitution and statutes to
examine applicants for admission to the state bar, formulate rules of professional conduct,
discipline members for misconduct, prevent unlawful practice of the law and improve the
administration of justice. Keller 47 Cal. 3d at 1159-61, 767 P.2d at 1023-24, 255 Cal. Rptr. at
545-46. The California state bar is also required to do the following: (1) Cooperate with and
give assistance to the Commission on Judicial Performance (CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68725 (West
1976)); (2) assist the Law Revision Commission (CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8287 (West Supp. 1989));(3) and evaluate the judicial qualifications of gubernatorial nominees for appointment to courts
of record (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12011.5 (West 1974)). The California State Bar is authorized to
do all acts "necessary or expedient for the administration of its affairs and the attainment of its
purposes." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6001(g) (West 1974). See Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1158-1162,
767 P.2d at 1023-25, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 545-47 (discussion of the codes). See also B. 'WrrN,
CAnroRmNA PROCEDURE, ArroRrNYs §259 (3rd ed. 1985 & supp. 1988) (for a discussion of the
functions of the California State Bar). Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has given the
bar almost unrestricted discretion when spending dues. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1167-68, 767 P.2d
at 1029, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
217. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (the question of what expenditures are
chargeable against bar members has been raised in Keller, and the Lathrop court reserved that
question for a later case).
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union paradigm is a helpful model in evaluating what expenditures
are properly chargeable against dissenters. 218 The analysis outlined in
Ellis provides a useful constitutional model to evaluate contested
expenditures. 2 9 The dissent in Keller discussed the Ellis analysis in
three specific areas. 220 As a general rule, expenditures not germane
to the state's interest in maintaining an integrated bar cannot be
assessed against objectors.?
4. Adequate Procedure
The California state bar should follow the procedural guidelines
established in Hudson.' The Hudson procedure includes three parts? 32
First the bar must give an adequate explanation of the basis for the
dues charged so that a dissenter can make a meaningful objection.?
To meet the first requirement, for example, the bar could inform
members of the proposed uses of dues when sending out the bill for
the upcoming year.? This would give potential objectors the oppor-
tunity to review proposed expenses and make an informed objection
and state a meritorious claim. 226
Second, the bar should provide for a reasonably prompt oppor-
tunity for dissenters to challenge the amount of the fee before an
impartial decision maker.227 To fulfill the second requirement, the
bar could establish a forum in which the dissenter could make the
challenge to the proposed expenditures before an impartial decision
maker.? This forum should minimize participation by the bar in the
decision making process. 229
218. Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1566 (llth Cir. 1986).
219. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 446 U.S. 435 (1984). See supra, notes 76-90,
198-202 and accompanying text (discussion of the Ellis three step analysis).
220. Keller 47 Cal. 3d at 1188-91, 767 P.2d at 1044-45, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 188-200 for a discussion of how the dissent applied Ellis).
221. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1186-90, 767 P.2d at 1043-44, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting). See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447-48; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-
36; Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir. 1986).
222. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1191-93, 767 P.2d at 1045-47, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 567-69 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
223. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 1075-78 (1985).
224. Id. at Ct. 1066, 1075-78 (1985).
225. Id. at 1074, 1078.
226. Id. at 1074.
227. Id. at 1076-77.
228. Id. at 1077.
229. Id. at 1077. The procedure in question in Hudson was controlled entirely by union
officials during the first two stages of objection and by an arbitrator chosen by the union in the
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Third, the bar should provide an escrow account for those amounts
reasonably in dispute while resolution of the challenges are pending. 2 0
To satisfy the third requirement, the Court in Hudson held that an
interest bearing escrow account for the amount reasonably in dispute
is required to ensure that the dues paid by dissenters are not used
even temporarily for an improper purpose.?'
D. Remedy
The bar should establish an interest bearing escrow account for
those amounts reasonably in dispute not only to protect the first
amendment rights of objectors from temporary infringement, but
also to provide a fund from which damages could be paid with
interest to prevailing objectors. The bar must provide for the return
of the nonchargeable proportion of the fees plus any interest earned? 2
Alternatively, the bar could arrange an advance reduction of fees
charged to those who indicate an objection to some of the purposes
for which the fees were used during the last fiscal year, or proposed
for the current fiscal year.23
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority in Keller correctly concluded that the state bar is a
governmental agency; however, the majority erred in concluding that
the bar was exempt from first amendment scrutiny.234 Although the
interest of the state in regulating the practice of law and improving
the administration of justice may be compelling, the extent of that
interest is limited by the first amendment. First, the bar can accom-
third stage, the court found this constitutionally inadequate but failed to propose a procedure
which would be. Id. The Court also seemed to indicated that a dissenter need not exhaust
internal hearings before requesting government arbitration. Id. Hudson held that the process of
objection must yield a prompt determination on the objection of the dissenter. Id. The Court
found that 90 days was not prompt enough. Id. at 1078 (White, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 1077-78.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1074, 1077-78.
234. Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1174-75, 767 P.2d 1020, 1034, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542,
556 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting). See Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir.
1986) (the Florida state bar's expenditures were subject to constitutional scrutiny even though
the bar was empowered via the state constitution to regulate the practice of law and further the
improvement of the administration of justice).
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plish their objectives without compelling membership by adopting an
agency shop arrangement. Second, the fees collected by the bar from
dissenters should be subject to constitutional scrutiny, as they were
in Gibson, and only those expenditures germane to the statutory
purpose of the bar are properly chargeable against dissenters. Third,
the bar must also adopt expedient, fair, and objective avenues for
the dissenters to voice their objections. Fourth, the remedy must
protect the rights of dissenters against temporary infringement and
return unconstitutionally collected fees with interest.
Christopher Yost
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